| 1,641 | 188 | 536 |
| 下载次数 | 被引频次 | 阅读次数 |
基于我国制度背景,利用上市公司的财务数据,实证检验了负债及负债结构对企业投资行为的影响。研究表明,相对投资不足行为,国有控股企业的过度投资行为更为显著,而非国有控股企业的这两种行为均较为显著;负债一方面可以抑制企业的过度投资,另一方面也使得企业投资不足问题更为严重;短期负债并没有降低企业的投资不足问题,但能够抑制企业的过度投资问题;银行借款并没有发挥其应有的相机治理作用。
Abstract：This paper offers an empirical analysis of the impact of the debt and debt structure exerted upon corporate investment of listed companies in China.The analysis indicates that over-investment is more evident in state-owned companies whereas both under-investment and over-investment are frequent occurrences in shareholding companies.On the one hand,debts cause constraints over-investment.On the other hand,they exacerbate the problem of under-investment.Although short-term debts do not lower under-investments,they restrict over-investments.The paper also suggests that bank loans fail to exercise its role of governance.
[1]哈特.企业、合同与财务结构[M].费方域,译.上海:上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,1998:19.
[2]MOD IGLIANI F,M ILLER M H.The Cost of Cap ital,Corporation F inance,and The Theory of Investm ent[J].The Am erican Econom ic Re-view,1958,48(3):261-297.
[3]JENSEN M C.Agency Costs of Free Cash flow,Corporate F inance,and Takeovers[J].Am erican Econom ic Review,1986,76:323-329.
[4]JENSEN M,MECKLING M.Theory of the F irm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Cap ital Structure[J].Journal of F inancial Econom-ics,1976,3:305-360.
[5]MYERS S C.D eterm inants of Corporate Borrow ing[J].Journal of F inancial Econom ics,1977,5:147-175.
[6]HO T S Y,SINGER S Y.Bond Indenture Provisions and the R isk of Corporate Debt[J].Journal of Financial Econom ics,1982,10:375-406.
[7]BARCLAY M,SM ITH C.The Maturity Structure of Corporate debt[J].Journal of F inance,1995,50:609-631.
[8]GUEDES J,TIM O.The D eterm inants of the Maturity of Corporate D ebt Issues[J].Journal of F inance,1996,51:1809-1833.
[9]BARNEA A,ROBERT H,LEMMA S.A Rationale for D ebtMaturity Structure and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic Fram ework[J].Journal of F inance,1980,35:1223-1234.
[10]SM ITH C W,WARNER J B.On Financial Contracting:Analysis of Bond Covenants[J].Journal of Financial Econom ics,1979(7):117-161.
[11]GROSSMAN S,HART O.Corporate F inancial Structure and Managerial Incentives[C]∥MCCALL J J.The Econom ics of Information andUncertainty.Ch icago:Un iversity of Ch icago Press,1982:107-140.
[12]BURKARTM,GROMB D,PANUNZI F.D ebt D esign,L iqu idation Value and Mon itoring[R].Massachusetts:M im eo,M IT,1996.
[13]LINS K V,HARVEY C R,ROPER A H.The E ffectO f Cap ital StructureW hen Expected Agency Costs Are Extrem e[J].Journal of F inan-cial Econom ics,2004,74(1):3-30.
[14]M IGUEL A,PINDADO J.D eterm inants of Cap ital Structure:New Evidence from Span ish Panel Data[J].Journal of Corporate F inance,2001,7:77-99.
[15]冯巍.内部现金流量和企业投资——来自我国股票市场上市公司财务报告的证据[J].经济科学,1999(1):51-57.
基本信息:
DOI：10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.2007.02.009
中图分类号:F275;F224
引用信息:
[1]王治,周宏琦.负债、负债结构与企业投资行为——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].海南大学学报(人文社会科学版),2007,No.95(02):169-175.DOI:10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.2007.02.009.
2007-04-25
2007-04-25