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黑格尔现象学中,“自我”(ich,区别于作为固化名词的das Ich)与“我们”(Wir)并非固定的术语,它们的语义是在不断变化和丰富的,其哲学意义是生成式建构起来的。其本体论基础在于,“精神”(Geist)的本质是实体即主体,也就是说实体之为实体必须自我证成,因而是主体,是通过全部意识的经验加以证明的。方法论由此与本体论相统一。而主体要证明自身是实体,就必须从意识走向“我即我们,我们即我”的规定性。因此,通过以全部意识经验的科学为中介的“自我”和“我们”之间不断趋同的关系重构,“我们”的身份实际上经历了从个别性“自我”之集合向“我即我们,我们即我”所蕴含的普遍性形态的转变,唯有历经这一过程,“我们”才真正成为“精神”。在此基础上,黑格尔的认识论路径包含了现代认识论三大原则的内在统一,即融贯性、符合性与共识性;同时也为现代个体的生存提供了极具解释力的镜像。
Abstract:In Hegel's Phenomenology, the "I"(ich, as distinct from das Ich, which functions as a substantive noun) and "We"(Wir) are not fixed terms. Their semantics is constantly evolving and expanding, and their philosophical significance is constructed in a generative manner. Their ontological foundation lies in the fact that the essence of spirit(Geist) is substance, that is, the subject. In other words, a substance must achieve self-justification to qualify itself as a substance; it is thus a subject, validated through the entsirety of conscious experience. Methodology is thus unified with ontology. For the subject to prove itself as a substance, it must advance from consciousness toward the determination of "I am we, and we are I. " Therefore, through the reconstruction of the ever-converging relationship between the "self" and "we" —mediated by the science of the entirety of conscious experience— "we" actually undergo a transformation in identity from a collection of individual "selves" to the universal form entailed in "I am we, and we are I." Only through this process do "we" truly become "spirit". On this basis, Hegel's epistemological approach embodies the inherent unity of the three core principles of modern epistemology: coherence, conformity, and consensus. Meanwhile, it also provides a highly explanatory mirror image for the existence of the modern individuals.
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(1)黑格尔在《精神现象学》一书序言中谈论个体的教养时曾将特殊的个体称为“不完全的精神”。
(1)在其中的译本后记中,贺麟与王玖兴认为书中出现的“我们”有两种指向,一种是“在我们[研究现象学的人]看来”之中的“我们”,“不是泛指一般的我们,而是确指用辩证法探讨精神现象发展的人或读者”;此外,根据译者对“自我”的解释,所谓“一般的我们”可以视为与个人或个体相对的“社会全体”。参见:黑格尔.精神现象学:下卷[M].贺麟,译.北京:商务印书馆,1979:313-314.
基本信息:
DOI:10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.202606.0038
中图分类号:B516.35
引用信息:
[1]闫裕,成官泯.镜像中的知识:《精神现象学》的“我们”与现代个体的反思[J].海南大学学报(社会科学版)().DOI:10.15886/j.cnki.hnus.202606.0038.
基金信息:
国家社会科学基金一般项目(24BZX061)
2026-09-07
2026-09-07
2026-09-07